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ABSTRACT

A survey of recent developments in faculty collective bargaining and its impact on American postsecondary education is presented. Faculty collective bargaining exists mainly in higher education institutions, with 85 percent of those participating coming from public sector campuses, in which 60 percent are community or junior colleges. The growth of faculty collective bargaining to date has closely paralleled state collective bargaining laws. About 34 percent of all public college and university campuses are unionized, and the figure is expected to reach between 40 and 50 percent by 1980. It is observed that generally state laws do not recognize college and university faculty as special categories of public employees, that there is considerable variability among the states with regard to the formal structural relationship between the institution and the state under collective bargaining, that there is considerable interstate variability as to what may be included or excluded from the scope of bargaining, and that collective bargaining provides a framework for a redistribution of authority and responsibility. The impact of bargaining on faculty governance is explored and the role of faculty participation in governance is considered. Questions assessing the potential impact of bargaining on campus governance structures are presented. The financial impacts of bargaining are examined and a summary of student involvement in the bargaining process is provided. (Author/PHR)

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A Survey of American Experience with Faculty Collective Bargaining

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by

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This paper is a general survey of recent developments in faculty collective bargaining and their impacts on American postsecondary education. Like any survey, it suffers from an attempt to generalize about phenomena that do not arrange themselves into "neat" classifications. A more detailed analysis of the developments sketched here is contained in Sharing Authority Effectively, except where otherwise noted (Mortimer and McConnell, 1978).

The paper first reports on the extent of collective bargaining and its projected growth in the next two or three years. The patterns of faculty bargaining in the various states are then presented and this is followed by a discussion of the impact of bargaining on faculty governance and a section on financial impacts. The final section is a summary of student involvement in the collective bargaining process.

THE EXTENT OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

There are three major points that can be made about the present and future status of collective bargaining in American postsecondary institutions. First, faculty collective bargaining is primarily a phenomenon of the public sector of higher education. There are now approximately 350 bargaining units representing about 120,000 faculty at about 580 campuses across the United States. Eighty-five percent of these campuses are in the public sector. About 60 percent of the campuses are community or junior colleges.

The second point is that the growth of faculty collective bargaining, to date, has closely paralleled the enactment of state

collective bargaining laws. Between 1965-1972, the growth of faculty collective bargaining was dominated by activity in a few heavily populated and relatively industrialized states that adopted enabling legislation before 1970. By 1973, there were a total of 161 organized institutions in Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania--representing 76 percent of the organized institutions in the country at that time. James Begin (1974, p. 79) documented a "slowdown" in the growth of faculty collective bargaining during 1973--a pattern that continued in 1974, leading some observers to predict a declining interest in the phenomenon. One of the major factors leading to the apparent "loss of momentum" in 1973, however, was the early proliferation of faculty bargaining units in the five states mentioned above. By early 1973, 79 percent of the 205 public institutions in this group of states had adopted collective bargaining, leaving little room for further growth.

Third, the enactment of new state collective bargaining laws in 1974, 1975, and 1976 resulted in moderate growth of faculty collective bargaining activity in the public sector. (According to the Carnegie Commission (1973, p. 6), there are approximately 1,450 public college and university campuses in the United States. As already noted, the faculties of about 495 of these campuses, or about 34 percent of the total, are currently represented by bargaining agents.) Given the current status of legislative activity in the states, a fairly conservative projection would indicate that an additional 135 campuses will be unionized by 1980, and that the new total will account for about

40 percent of all public campuses. It is possible that the figure will go as high as 230 additional campuses for a new total of approximately 50 percent of all public campuses.

ACTIVITY IN THE STATES

Collective bargaining in the public sector is regulated or influenced by a collage of state labor laws and/or ad hoc agreements. About 23 states now have statutes which permit collective bargaining for public employees and which have been interpreted to include college faculty and non-teaching professionals. In addition, some community colleges bargain under municipal statutes (e.g., Chicago City Colleges), and some institutions bargain or have held elections on the basis of mutual agreements between the faculties and representatives of the governing board. Even without statutory mandates, the Board of Governors in Illinois sanctioned an election and the University of Cincinnati and Youngstown State in Ohio have faculty bargaining relationships.

There are four general observations about the framework for faculty bargaining in states with bargaining statutes. First, state bargaining laws rarely recognize college and university faculty as "special" categories of public employees, if indeed, they are. If higher education is different from other public agencies, those differences, for the most part, are not reflected in statutes (the Oregon statute does have a special two-step election procedure for higher education, and the Montana law has special clauses on bargainable items and student involvement in bargaining).

Second, there is considerable variability among the states with regard to the formal structural relationship between the institution and the state under collective bargaining. For the most part, structural arrangements parallel the pre-bargaining governance relationship within each state. There appear to be at least four definite structural patterns of faculty bargaining in the states. The patterns described below are a modification and elaboration of those first developed by Weinberg (1974) and refined by Mortimer and Johnson (1976). (See also Mortimer [ed.] 1976).

The first structural type is the individual institution bargaining that occurs in Michigan and Ohio. Neither state has a strong central coordinating and/or governing board that oversees faculty bargaining. Michigan especially has a laissez-faire system in this regard.

The second pattern is individual campus bargaining with systemwide coordination. Rhode Island, Montana, and Oregon appear to have this structure. The bargaining here typically is handled by a management team consisting of both central board staff and campus-based administrators. In these situations, there is some pressure for systemwide standardization of items covered in the contract.

The third structural pattern occurs in those states with separate sectors of postsecondary education, usually a university, a state college, and a community college segment. There are at least 10 of these states: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. The organization of higher education in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and

Alaska illustrate the complexity of this structural category.

In Massachusetts, higher education is controlled by five different governing boards: The University of Massachusetts Board, which controls three campuses; the Massachusetts State College Board of Trustees, which governs a ten campus system; the Massachusetts Board of Regional and Community Colleges, which governs a fifteen campus system; the Board of Southeastern Massachusetts University; and the Board of the University of Lowell, which was formed by a merger of Lowell Technological Institute and Lowell State College. Each of these governing boards is responsible for negotiating faculty contracts.

In Pennsylvania, the public higher education system is divided into three sectors. There are four state-related universities: Lincoln University, The Pennsylvania State University, Temple University, and The University of Pittsburgh. Each governing board has the authority to negotiate contracts and to make whatever financial agreements are required. To date, only Temple and Lincoln bargain with their faculties. The University of Pittsburgh faculty rejected collective bargaining in March 1976, and the Penn State faculty did so in the Spring of 1977.

The second major sector in Pennsylvania is the state college and university system. These fourteen campuses have a central board, the Board of State College and University Directors, but the essential elements of control rest with the Pennsylvania Department of Education (Johnson and Mortimer, 1977). The Department is responsible for line-item analysis of college budgets and for negotiating system-

wide collective bargaining agreements with the faculty.

A third sector of higher education in Pennsylvania is the fourteen community colleges. Each college board has the authority to negotiate with its faculty and arrive at agreements that are to be funded by their sponsoring school districts or local boards.

The Board of Regents of the University of Alaska bargains with a representative of the eight community college faculties. The faculty at the three four-year campuses in the University system are just beginning an organizing campaign.

In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Minnesota, the community college systems are funded almost entirely from state revenues. Community college bargaining is on a systemwide basis in these three states.

The centralizing potential of collective bargaining in these ten states with separate sector bargaining tends to be more at the system rather than state levels. The relative autonomy of the university segments and those community colleges with local funding bases from state agencies appears to be only marginally affected by bargaining.

The fourth structural category involves the comprehensive system-wide bargaining that occurs (or will occur) in Maine, New York, Florida, and Hawaii. These systemwide units incorporate institutions of different types (two-year and four-year) and missions (research-oriented universities and former state teachers colleges or colleges of arts and science) into one homogeneous structure. The Florida and State University of New York units do not include community colleges. The potential for centralization at the system level in these comprehensive units is

substantial. Here again, however, actual centralization will vary.

After examining papers on the relations between state governments, system level and campus constituents under faculty bargaining in eight states, Weinberg (1976, p. 106) was able to summarize the factors that are associated with the degree of centralization and/or homogenization that occurs with six major observations.

First, the more highly placed within the state bureaucracy the office of employee relations, the more power within the office and the more pressure for centralization and state control. Those states with no central state apparatus for state employee bargaining have the most decentralized relationship with higher education administration: Michigan, Ohio, and Delaware. In situations where the state is defined to be the employer, institutional governing boards and administrators tend to lose a degree of their previous authority. In cases where systemwide boards or administrators are the employer, campus officials are relegated to advisory and/or consultative administrative roles on those issues within the scope of the contract (for example, New York and the Pennsylvania and New Jersey state colleges). Whatever control campus officials retain over these items is based on influence rather than authority relationships.

Second, the broader and more comprehensive the bargaining unit, the greater the degree of leveling and/or homogenizing associated with collective bargaining. The inclusion of non-faculty titles in faculty units is associated with demands to extend faculty benefits to other members of the unit. The inclusion of two-year college faculty in

units with more research-oriented university faculty tends to produce extensive demands to "level out" faculty benefits, since traditional peer judgments are not as important to a community college as they are to a research community.

Third, the broader the scope of the contract, the greater the centralizing tendencies of collective bargaining. The centralizing potential of bargaining has been somewhat neutralized in SUNY and Hawaii because of the narrow scope of those contracts. The broad scope of the Pennsylvania State College and University and Massachusetts State College contracts has heightened the centralization potential of bargaining.

Fourth, the degree of centralization under collective bargaining is strongly influenced by the prebargaining structure and degree of centralization. Bargaining appears to have little impact on the structure of higher education. Those states with strong state government involvement or systemwide governing boards tend to centralize bargaining responsibility in those boards. Those states with strong traditions of decentralized authority and/or high degrees of autonomy tend to reflect these traditions in their bargaining relations.

Fifth, collective bargaining brings the specific issues of faculty salaries, fringe benefits, and personnel policies to the attention of state executive officials and legislatures. The degree of subsequent centralization has varied. In some cases, legislatures have to ratify certain aspects of the contract and, in a few cases (for example, Alaska), they have done so reluctantly. Many state officials have

specifically refused to negotiate any faculty benefits that are not granted to all of the state's public employees. In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Hawaii, faculty economic increases are tied to those given other public employees.

Sixth, the degree of centralization is directly related to the strength of faculty involvement in governance at the campus level. There seems to be a tendency to let local mechanisms continue to handle issues where both parties perceive these mechanisms to have been effective in the past. State and systemwide officials on both sides are reluctant to centralize matters that local parties agree are functional, so long as they are consistent with the master agreement.

A third general observation about the structure for bargaining in the separate states is that there is considerable variability in state statutes as to what may be included or excluded from the scope of bargaining. Some of this language is mandatory, such as that contained in clauses that prohibit bargaining over various civil service regulations. Much of it, however, is permissive, as is the language in most "management rights" clauses, which allow managers to exclude certain "inherent managerial prerogatives" from the scope of bargaining but do not force them to do so.

Fourth and finally, collective bargaining introduces a potentially important set of "new" actors and provides a framework for a redistribution of authority and responsibility among the traditional actors in the arena of academic governance. In addition to state labor relations boards, the "new" actors include union officials, arbitrators,

mediators, and an array of state administration labor relations officials. Most, if not all, of these individuals operate from the same basic set of assumptions about labor relations; their primary experiences are not with education; and they represent an important new policy-making constituency whose base(s) of operation are external to academic institutions. Particularly in the early stages of collective bargaining, when labor relations expertise is at a premium, these new actors play an important part in shaping the role of the collective bargaining relationship in the governance of higher education.

GOVERNANCE IMPACTS

Since the topic of governance is such a broad one, I will limit my remarks to the relationships between union and campus governance machanisms and processes like faculty senates and councils.

Mortimer and McConnell argue that it is difficult to generalize about governance matters, and adopt a contingency approach to academic decison making. Decisions are highly contingent upon the values, history, culture, and the personalities involved in individual cases, and gross attempts to generalize about these phenomena are very difficult to apply in individual cases.

Having offered this caveat, I will now proceed to generalize about phenomena that do not lend themselves to accurate generalizations.

There are five important points to keep in mind before beginning the substantive discussion. First, most of the institutions where the faculty have unionized do not have strong traditions of faculty

participation in governance such as those that tend to dominate the traditional "research-oriented" universities. In fact, it has not been empirically determined that faculty do dominate the decision-making processes of the research-oriented institutions. It has been empirically demonstrated that these traditions do not permeate community colleges and state colleges that are the bastions of faculty unionism (Mortimer and Richardson 1977).

Second, there are very few rules that apply to all circumstances. Third, senates and faculty councils are examples of faculty participation in governance at the campus level. An increasingly important level of governance to which we speak little in this paper, and in most of the literature on bargaining, is the system level (Johnson and Mortimer 1977). Similarly, the traditional literature on the impact of collective bargaining on governance says little about governance at the college level within a complex university, or at the department level. We still need some basic empirical work on these levels. Fourth, differences of opinion on the impact of bargaining on governance are rife and tend to reflect one's position on the desirability of bargaining. For example, Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) report that 70 percent of the presidents agreed that collective bargaining would undermine the influence of the faculty senate, whereas only 36 percent of the union presidents agreed to such a statement. Fifth, the question of impact is not resolvable in social science terms. It is methodologically almost impossible to isolate the impact of collective bargaining from a variety of other social forces that are related to changes in governance structures and processes.

The General Structure

In discussing patterns of union/senate relationships, Garbarino (1975) formulated three different patterns that describe the outcomes of union/senate situations: cooperative, competitive, and cooptative. Garbarino's cooperative model describes the situation where the senate and the union are active and function in faculty affairs, however, each has its own area of jurisdiction. The competitive model occurs when greater competition exists between the senate and the union. In this situation, both bodies compete actively for faculty support and jurisdiction over decision-making areas. Garbarino's cooptative model is described as "bargained collegiality or collegiality by contract." In such cases, the union has clearly "won" and the senate may be dissolved or is virtually inactive or may be a creature of the union.

In assessing the early reports of relationships between bargaining agents and senates on unionized campuses, both Garbarino and Jim Begin (1974) reported that the cooperative model appeared to be the most dominant. Senates and unions have tended to differentiate their areas of jurisdiction, and occasionally to develop dual leadership and membership. Senates have been preserved on many campuses and have retained some areas of influence, primarily in the areas of educational policy, but not in areas having to do with faculty personnel.

While many of the senate/union relationships have been successful in avoiding successive competition, there are some examples of the other types. We can report some empirical data on these kinds of relationship in both Pennsylvania and through my colleague Jim Begin's

work in New Jersey.

In 1975, Walter Gershenfeld and Mortimer published a report on the findings from an extensive field investigation of collective bargaining activity at 42 institutions of higher education in Pennsylvania. The cut-off date for the study was September 1975.

Faculty Participation in Governance

The analyses of faculty roles in governance under collective bargaining in our report focus on two basic but interdependent issues: the general nature and level of faculty participation in governance, and the respective roles of faculty union organizations and academic senates. The data collected led to a number of generalizations and some specific observations.

First, faculty participation in governance has increased at almost all of the institutions examined during the 1970-1975 period.

Second, academic senates have been weakened at most institutions; in a few cases, they have been dissolved; but they continue to play a viable role in a number of other cases.

Third, institutional administrators appear to favor the maintenance and/or development of non-union forums to faculty input in the decision-making process.

Fourth, faculty input on noncontractual matters continues to be advisory in nature.

Fifth, it is probably too early in most cases to make definitive judgments about the long-run consequences of collective bargaining for

academic senates and non-union faculty committees in Pennsylvania.

Let me be a bit more specific about some of the cases we encountered. Lincoln University has traditionally and continues to employ a system of faculty committees in lieu of an academic senate. The most important of these committees, the educational policy committee, continued to operate with full support of both parties, but it has been reluctant to deal with matters that might be the subject of collective bargaining. The Temple University Senate continued to operate, its policies concerning promotion and tenure are formally included in the contract, and the senate personnel committee is still involved in the implementation of those policies. The AAUP has maintained a fairly cooperative stance with the senate and is reportedly happy to be spared the burden of the senate's workload. The Temple Law School retained its previous joint governance mechanisms and the faculty continues to play a substantial role in governance, primarily on a noncontractual basis.

Most of the 14 state colleges did not have senates until the second half of the 1960s, and few of these senates ever played an influential role in governance. Since the adoption of collective bargaining, two of the state college senates have been dissolved and four of them appear to play only a social and/or clerical role. The activity of the remaining eight is confined for the most part to curriculum and student affairs. The union locals on these campuses tend to favor a continued though limited role for their senates, and most administrators strongly favor the maintenance of non-union

mechanisms for faculty input. The union locals, however, clearly have the upper hand and most respondents agree that a confrontation between a union local and a senate would almost certainly result in the demise of the senate. The union locals play a significant role on most of the campus via state-mandated participation in planning and budget committees. At five of the colleges, curriculum committees, required by contracts, are reportedly dominated by the union locals. In a number of cases, the union local is either consulted or allowed to appoint faculty representatives to noncontractual college-wide committees.

Among nine pre-bargaining senates in the ten unionized community colleges in Pennsylvania, five of them dissolved, two are inactive, and the remaining two have been substantially weakened. At three of the colleges, however, elaborate systems of joint faculty administration committees are provided for by contract, and a number of the community colleges have developed similar systems on an extra-contractual basis. The noncontractual role of faculty union organizations appears to vary substantially. At one extreme, the union organization appoints the majority membership of all college-wide committees. In contrast, the union organization at another college reportedly has minimal influence in noncontractual matters.

There were only three unionized private institutions in Pennsylvania at the time of our study. The pre-bargaining senate at one college initially played a role in providing faculty input on salaries and fringe benefits. This arrangement was followed by the formation of an informal faculty bargaining committee that was

replaced by a certified bargaining agent in late 1974, after four years of operation. The pre-bargaining senates at the other two institutions are now dormant. One of them has been replaced by an extensive committee system. At the other college, a contractual provision for administrative "consultation" with the faculty on noncontractual matters was currently being implemented.

James Begin (1977) has reported rather extensively on the impact of collective bargaining on the community colleges in New Jersey. He makes a number of comments as follows:

1. The beginning of the two-year colleges in New Jersey coincided very closely with collective bargaining legislation and this means there were no long traditions developed for faculty participation and decision making prior to the onset of collective bargaining.
2. Despite the lack of history, nine of the sixteen colleges developed representative forms of faculty governance outside of bargaining.
3. Eight of the nine colleges where there is a representative body selected representatives from faculty, administrators, and students. At the ninth college, membership includes both the faculty and the administration.
4. In three of the four colleges where faculty involvement is primarily through a committee structure, the procedure by which faculty are appointed has been negotiated.
5. In all colleges where there is a representative body, its

decisions (recommendations) go to the President who in turn submits his own recommendation to the Board of Trustees on issues requiring Board approval.

6. In several of the colleges, the representative body can override a presidential veto and make a presentation of its position to the Board of Trustees at the same time as the President (pp. 120-125).

Earlier in this paper I said there were probably no rules to apply to the relationship between unions and campus governing structures. Let me amend that principle now to state that "there is probably evidence or an incident to illustrate whatever case one wants to make about the relationships between senates and/or faculty governing structures and collective bargaining."

I have been asked several times to advise institutions and/or faculties considering unionization about the impact that it is likely to have on existing faculty governance structures at the campus level. I have always refused to give a specific answer to such a question, since I firmly believe that it depends on a number of factors that are almost impossible to judge in advance. There are five questions that might allow a reasonable answer to assessing the potential impact of bargaining on campus governance structures.

1. Why do the faculty vote to unionize in the first place? In many cases, unionization is a revolt of junior faculty against the control of governance structures by senior faculty. In other cases, it is a concern about the dominance of governance structures by the faculty at

one campus as opposed to those at other campuses and, in still other cases, it is an attempt by non-teaching professionals to gain some status as faculty. In other cases, it is a combination of these and more complex factors. In still other cases, it is a response of a faculty to the fear that they may be punished by the legislature or collapsed with other colleges and universities within the state if they do not unionize. My point here is simply that the impact of bargaining governance on structures depends on the extent of which there is considerable conflict within the faculty prior to unionization.

2. Are there people in the bargaining unit who are not represented in existing governance mechanisms? If the bargaining unit should include non-teaching professionals and/or librarians who are not represented in traditional governance structures, the impact of collective bargaining on governance is likely to be greater.

3. What is the scope of bargaining at the institution? This is not a legal question but rather a political one that seeks to ascertain what agreements the parties have negotiated. In conditions where the contract is relatively narrow, the impact upon governance is, naturally, likely to be less. I would stress, however, this is likely only where both parties agree that the contract should be narrow rather than in those situations where narrow contract is the subject of extensive administrative reluctance to negotiate non-mandatory subjects.

4. Who "controls" the union? To what extent are the senate and the union's leadership overlapping? We have few empirical studies to get an answer to this question, but it is my instinct that such matters

are important in the overall judgment about the impact of bargaining on governance.

5. What is the attitude of the administration and the faculty about the appropriate role of the senate and/or a union? There is often a philosophical as well as practical debate between the parties as to the appropriate role of a union in academic affairs. In 1975, Mortimer and Richardson uncovered some interesting relationships between the senate and the union at a university in Massachusetts (Governance in Institutions with Collective Bargaining: Six Case Studies, 1977). After five or six years of operation under a collective bargaining agreement, both the administration and the senate came to believe that there were certain matters that should not be handled through the contract, but rather through an academic senate. The senate, which had been moribund for the previous three to five years, was reconstituted and its role was negotiated informally with leaders of the union, the supporters of the senate, and the administration. The administration's view was that the senate's role had to be agreed to by the union, but once these agreements had been arrived at, it would be binding on all parties. Eventually a system was worked out whereby the senate's recommendations were sent to the President who, when he agreed, sent them to the Board for approval. When the President disagreed with the senate, he agreed to return them to the senate where a two-thirds majority vote would override the President's veto, and the matter would then be sent to the Board for its action. The point here is simply that both parties worked out arrangements relative to the senate.

FINANCIAL IMPACTS

Recently, Professors Larry L. Leslie and Teh-wei Hu have completed a study sponsored by the Center for the Study of Higher Education on selected financial implications of collective bargaining. They developed a regression model using 150 pairs of matched unionized and non-unionized institutions in order to determine the direct effects of bargaining upon faculty salaries and fringe benefits and on institutional financial ledgers overall from 1969 through 1976/76 (1977). I report only their more relevant findings here.

First, holding other factors constant, average salary compensation in unionized institutions during 1974/1975 was about $1,291 more than in non-unionized institutions. Further, it was found that this compensation advantage had increased steadily to 1974/1975 at which time a reversal was noted; and in 1975/1976, the $1,291 advantage had shrunk to $800.

Second, they report that affiliation with an NEA-AFT union was associated with higher faculty compensation than affiliation with the American Association of University Professors.

Third, the regression results suggest that the higher the ranks of faculty, the larger their financial gains as compared to non-union institutions.

Fourth, the regression results show that unionization has a significant impact on student tuition and fees. Holding the quality of the school and the public versus private factor constant, the students in unionized institutions paid about $250 more than those in non-unionized

institutions in 1973/1974. The results suggest that institutions of higher education raised tuition and fees in accordance with the higher faculty compensation.

Students and Faculty Collective Bargaining

There is beginning to be an increase in student activity in and concern about collective bargaining. A national Research Project on Students and Collective Bargaining is studying the impact of collective bargaining on students, as well as the potential impact of students on the collective bargaining process. According to Aussieker (1975), student involvement in collective bargaining can be classified into six types: end-run bargaining; consultation and observation; coalition bargaining; tripartite bargaining; collective bargaining over student status; and student employee bargaining.

Student appeals to the appropriate governing body or the legislature are examples of end-run bargaining. In the Pennsylvania State College and University System, the student leaders at one campus appeared before the local Board of Trustees to argue against a tuition-remission plan for faculty dependents. Their arguments were one of the factors that resulted in Board rejection of the plan. In Washington and California, lobbyists are making determined efforts to mold collective bargaining legislation that is at least sensitive to their concerns.

In some institutions, students have served as observers of union and management negotiations. This has occurred at CUNY, Long Island University, and in some of the Massachusetts State Colleges. In other

institutions, students have formed coalitions with either faculty or administrators. For example, at Ferris State College in Michigan, a student sat on management's bargaining team. At a university in Massachusetts, student leaders forced student evaluation of instruction on the faculty bargaining team and eventually got it incorporated into the contract.

Tripartite bargaining occurs where all three parties have to ratify a final agreement. In three of the Massachusetts State Colleges, students were called upon to ratify those aspects of the contract that applied to their participation in college governance. The fifth type of student involvement is collective bargaining itself. In 1971, Chicago City College's students negotiated an agreement with the Board that has been incorporated into the Board Rules and that has, its advocates argue, the same legal status as a contract (Swenson, 1974, pp. 106-110). The agreement guarantees student control over student fees, provides for student participation in college governance, and guarantees constitutional freedoms and due process rights to students.

The sixth type of student involvement in bargaining is as employees. The University of Wisconsin Teaching Assistant Association negotiated an agreement, after a strike, in April 1970. (The University of Minnesota teaching assistants rejected collective bargaining in a Spring 1974 election.) Teaching assistants are now part of the Rutgers faculty bargaining unit.

Aussieker reports that the extent of student involvement has not been extensive or broad in scope. "As of Fall 1974, there were

approximately thirty incidents of the more formal types of involvement (coalition, tripartite, student and student employee bargaining) and about seventy incidents of the more informal types (consultation or end-run bargaining) [1975, p. 17]." In four-year institutions, 14 of 48 bargaining units reported some student involvement in the negotiation or administration of the contract; 13 of these were in public institutions; and half were of the weak tripartite bargaining type.

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